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Population
The rate of population growth, f −m, is the difference
between the fertility rate f and mortality rate m:
N˙
N
.
=
1
N
dN
dt
= f −m, N(0) = N0,
where t is time and N population.
We assume that rearing each newborn requires a fixed
amount q of labor. Then, the number of newborns is given
by fN, the total labor in child rearing by qfN, and labor
devoted to production, L, is equal to population N minus
labor in child rearing, qfN:
L = N − qfN = lN.
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Production and emissions
Two sectors produce the same good, clean with output Yc
and dirty with output Yd . That good is consumed C and
invested in capital K .
The clean sector Yc does not emit at all, but dirty sector Yd
emits in one-to-one proportion.
The government sets the tax x on emissions Yd and
distributes the tax revenue xYd to the families through a
poll transfer s:
xYd = sN.
Capital K and labor L are transferable between the sectors:
L ≥ Lc + Ld , K ≥ Kc + Kd ,
where Lj and Kj are labor and capital in sector j ∈ {c,d}.
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Production
The sectors j ∈ {c,d} have linearly homogeneous
production functions
Yj = F j(Kj ,Lj), F
j
K > 0, F
j
L > 0, F
j
KK < 0, F
j
LL < 0, F
j
KL > 0,
where the subscripts K and L denote the partial derivatives
of the function F j with respect to inputs Kj and Lj .
We define consumption, capital and labor inputs per head:
c .= C/N, k .= K/N and ki
.
= Kj/N and lj
.
= Lj/N for j ∈ {c,d}.
Then, we can transform the resource constraints into
k ≥ kc + kd , 1− qf = l ≥ lc + ld ,
yc
.
= Yc/N = F c(kc , lc), yd
.
= Yd/N = F d(kd , ld).
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Utility
Capital accumulation is given by
K˙ .=
dK
dt
= Yc + Yd + sN − xYd − C − δK , K (0) = K0,
where Yc + Yd is factor revenue from production, sN poll
transfers, xYd , emission taxes, C consumption and δ > 0
the depreciation rate of capital.
The representative family’s expected utility for t ∈ [0,∞) is
U .=
∫ ∞
0
1
1− α
[
c(t)1−α + βf (t)1−α
]
e−[m(t)+ρ]tdt , α > 0,
where c(t) is consumption per head, f (t) fertility and m(t)
mortality at time t , α 6= 0 and β > 0 are constants, and
ρ > 0 the constant rate of time preference.
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The representative family
The representative family takes the mortality rate m, the
tax x and the poll transfer s as given.
It maximizes its expected utility for the period t ∈ [0,∞),
U .=
∫ ∞
0
1
1− α
[
c(t)1−α + βf (t)1−α
]
e−(m+ρ)tdt ,
by its per capita consumption c and the allocation of labor
and capital, (lc , ld , f , kc , kd), subject to technology
Yj = F j(Kj ,Lj), j ∈ {c,d}, labor supply L = N − qfN and
the accumulation of capital per head,
k˙ =
(
K˙
N
)
= F c(kc , lc) + (1− x)F d(kd , ld) + s − c + (m − f − δ)k ,
k(0) = k0.
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Maximization
Solving this maximization problem by Pontryagin’s
maximum principle yields fertility f = ϕ(k , x), per head
revenue
y(k , f , x) .=
max
(lc , ld , kc , kd ) s.t.
k ≥ kc + kd , 1 ≥ qf + lc + ld
[F c(kd , ld) + (1− x)F d(kd , ld)]
and the Euler equation
c˙
c
=
1
α
[
∂y
∂k
− ρ− δ − f
]
=
1
α
[
∂y
∂k
(x)− ρ− δ − ϕ(k , x)c
]
.
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Result
Proposition
Assume that the tax rate x is held constant. Dirty production yd
and the fertility rate f are then positively correlated, if the dirty
sector is the capital-intensive sector:
∂yd
∂f
(x) > 0 ⇔ kd
ld
>
kc
lc
.
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Pollution
We assume that the mortality rate m is an increasing
function of total pollution P:
m(P), m′ > 0.
Emissions Yd generate pollution P according to
P˙ .=
dP
dt
= ydN − ωP = −∂y
∂x
N − ωP, 0 < ω < 1, P(0) = P0,
where the constant ω is the absorbtion by nature.
Noting these, the rate of population growth becomes
N˙
N
= ϕ(k , x)c −m(P), N(0) = N0.
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Capital accumulation at the macroeconomic level
The dynamics of the economy is dictated by four
differential equations:
the Euler equation
the evolution of pollution P
the evolution of population N
the evolution of capital per head k
This system has three predetermined variables, pollution
P, population N and the capital-labor ratio k and per head
consumption c as a jump variable.
Thus, the system must have three stable roots and one
unstable root to have a saddle point solution and a unique
steady-state equilibrium. This holds true if and only if
∂y
∂k
+ ϕk
c
ϕ
> δ.
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Steady state
We denote the steady-state value of a variable by
superscript (∗).
In the steady-state equilibrium (c∗, f ∗, k∗,P∗,N∗) both
population and pollution are constant.
Because the government observes the link from pollution
to mortality, the social welfare function is obtained by
plugging this link into the representative family’s utility
function as follows:
U .=
∫ ∞
0
1
1− α
[
c(t)1−α + βf (t)1−α
]
e−[m(P(t))+ρ]tdt .
Because we consider optimal taxation in the steady state
(f ∗,U∗, k∗,P∗,N∗), this social welfare takes the form:
U∗ =
(c∗)1−α + β(f ∗)1−α
(1− α)(f ∗ + ρ) .
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Comparative statics
Differentiating the steady-state conditions and the social welfare
function with respect to the tax x yields the following result:
Proposition
(a) If and only if dirty sector is relatively capital
intensive (i.e. kd/ld > kc/lc), an increase in the
emission tax x decreases the fertility rate f ∗, the
mortality rate m∗ and total pollution P∗. It also
increases the capital-labor ratio k∗ and per head
consumption c∗.
(b) If and only if dirty sector is relatively capital
intensive (i.e. kd/ld > kc/lc), and if the family’s
elasticity of substitution between fertility and
consumption, 1α , is low enough, then a small
emission tax x is welfare enhancing.
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Interpretation
If the dirty sector is more capital-intensive than the clean
sector, then the Rybczynski theorem implies that the
environmental tax x on the dirty sector rises the relative
price of the this technology to 1 + x .
This curbs down dirty production and transfers factors of
production to the labor-intensive clean sector. The
increasing demand for labor puts an upward pressure on
wages.
A higher wage, in turn, encourages labor to migrate from
child rearing to production. This will decrease fertility and
increase per head consumption.
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Capital intensive clean sector
Let us now adopt the opposite assumption that the clean sector
is the more capital intensive one: kd/ld < kc/lc .
Then, the emission tax x increases the relative price of the
dirty technology from 1 to 1 + x .
This curbs down dirty production and transfers factors of
production to the capital-intensive clean sector, putting a
downward pressure in wages.
A lower wage discourages employment and pushes people
to child rearing, which increases the fertility rate and may
decrease welfare in future.
Thus, surprisingly, a subsidy to dirty production can be
welfare enhancing, if kd/ld < kc/lc .
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Conclusion
If the dirty sector is more capital intensive than the clean
sector, then the environmental policy rises labor demand
and thus wages. This tends to rise the opportunity costs of
children, the demand of which decreases.
But, if the clean sector is more capital-intensive, then
pollution taxes decrease wages, generating the opposite
development. In that case, the burden to provide capital to
greater population will curb down per head consumption.
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